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ments, and of the Bench and Bar of Connecticut, and the
alumni, students, and friends of the Law School. On the
platform were seated the speakers of the day. It is with
great pleasure that we print in this number of the JouimAL a
complete stenographic report of these exercises. After the
meeting the building was thrown open for inspection and an
informal reception was held in the new south reading-room
on the third floor.
At a recent meeting of the JOURNAL Board Mr. Frank W.




The vexed question of where the Federal power over inter-
state commerce ends and State control begins is involved in
the very important case of Austin v. Tennessee, 21 Sup. Ct.
132. Under a statute making it a misdemeanor to sell cigar-
ettes, or bring them into the State for sale, Austin was prose-
cutedforselling an ordinary pack of cigarettes which he had re-
ceived by express from North Carolina, together with other sim-
ilar packages, all thrown into a basket and dumped upon his
counter in Tennessee. The Supreme Court of the State is re-
versed in its contention that cigarettes, being inherently bad
and bad only, were not a legitimate article of commerce, but
sustained (four justices dissenting) in holding that the single
packs were not original packages.
The doctrine of original packages, which has played so im-
portant a part in interstate commerce law, first cropped out
in Brow-n v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, where a State statute
imposing a tax on parcels and packages imported from abroad
was void as being a tax on imports, so long as the original
packages remained in the importer's hands. The right to im-
port was thus made by Chief Justice Marshall to include the
incidental right to sell. Again, in Bowman v. Northwestern
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Ry., 125 U. S. 465, the right of a State to demand a license of
carriers requiring them to ship liquors only to licensed con-
signees, was denied. And what has since become the leading
case, Feesy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, upheld the right of a per-
son in Illinois to ship beer into Iowa and sell it in original
packages, despite State statutes. This decision led to grave
abuses, and culminated in Congress giving over to the States
the necessary power of regulating liquor traffic. Its constitu-
tionality was sustained in in re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545. The
rule was next carried a step further by declaring that whether
the package imported is suitable for retail as well as wholesale
trade, the importer's right to sell depends solely on the consid-
eration of its being an original package; and a special verdict
finding a ten-pound keg of oleomargarine to be an original
package, similar to those customarily used in the trade, and
not shipped with the intention of evading the State law, was
upheld though the package was sold direct to the consumer.
Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 175 U. S. 1.
The latest case holds that imported dry goods may be
taxed by a State after the box they were imported inis broken
and the unbroken packages it contained are sold, the original
box and not the parcels it contained being the original pack-
age. May v. New Orleans, 178 U. S. 495.
Assuming that the Federal government has paramount
control over interstate commerce; that it is for it, not the
States, to say an article should be extra commerciam," and its
silence negatives this conclusion; and that the reserved police
power in the States is subordinate to the Federal power of reg-
ulating commerce, the minority holds that each package was
an original package and if shipped into the State of right,
could not be an evasion of its law; while White, J., concurring
with the majority, rests his opinion on the size and surround-
ing circumstances, viz: trifling value, lack of shipping
marks, etc.
Reverting to Brown v. Maryland, supra, it will be seen
that the purpose of the original-package doctrine is to point
out the time when imported property passes from commerce
and the protection the Federal government throws around it,
and becomes segregated with the mass of State property and
subject to State control. Technically, perhaps the size of the
package has nothing to do with the right, nor the fact that the
sale is direct to the consumer. But as suchconclusions logically
carried out would paralyze much salutary State police regula-
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tion, we think the result reached by the majority, considering
the basket the original package, is liberal and sound. It finds
the same support as do regulations excluding diseased cattle,
inspection laws and preventive measures regarding danger-
ous articles still in the hands of the importer, which are based
simply on the reason and necessity of the thing. But as
Brewer, J., dissenting, remarks, it is to be regretted that a
great constitutional question should go off simply on the facts
and circumstances of the particular case, prescribing no
general rule.
HANDWRITING EXPERT EVIDENCE.
The ruling of Justice Fursman, in the re-trial of Dr. Kenne-
dy for murder in New York city, refusing to admit the evidence
of handwriting expert Kinsley, has created a profound sensa-
tion. If correct, it will upset settled convictions of Bench and
Bar in many quarters. The opinion generally prevails that
such evidence is admissible, and in the former trial, convinced
doubtless of its futility, no objection on this score was made by
the able counsel for the defendant.
In the present case, a check for $13,000 was found on the
person of the murdered girl, and on the floor of the room a
torn memorandum, containing the words " E. Maxwell and
wife," corresponding with the entry on the hotel register.
To show motive, the prosecution offered to prove by expert
Kinsley, after comparison with admittedly genuine specimens,
that the check and memorandum were written by the defendant.
This evidence the trial judge excluded, and stated in effect
that while admissible in the case of disputed writings, this
check and memorandum were not "disputed writings" within
statutory intendment in New York, nor by a proper construc-
tion of the decisions of its courts of last resort. Further, that
such expert evidence is only admissible when the writings them-
selves are in issue. Here the subject of the controversy was
the killing of the girl, and these writings were merely evidential.
Justice Fursman was quoted in the public press as stating
that the same ruling would inevitably have been made in the
former trial, had the question been raised.
Despite these positive statements of the trial judge, it is
conservative to state that the question is by no means settled
beyond peradventure, and considerable speculation will attach
to the decision of the Court of Appeals on this point if it comes
217
YALE LA W JOURNAL.
before that tribunal. If Justice Fursman is right, there cer-
tainly exists in legal minds a general misconception as to the
effect of statute and judicial decision on this point, which
should be cleared up by an official pronouncement of the
proper court.
Speaking generally of the law in this country, the opinion
of an expert based on his careful comparison of the disputed
writing with a genuine specimen is generally held admissible.
In a comparatively recent case (Dressler v. Hard, 127 N. Y.)
it became material whether an ambiguous word in the date
was "Jan." or "July." The testimony of an expert who had
examined admittedly genuine specimens was excluded by the
trial judge, and thi was held reversible error. The principle
involved was whether a doubtful word in a written instrument
might be shown by expert testimony, and it is pertinent, al-
though distinguishable from the present case.
The point ruled on by Justice Fursman has been the subject
of much controversy both here and in England,and it would be
useless to attempt to reconcile the decisions at common law.
Of course this expert opinion is designed simply to aid the jury,
and they are to weigh the evidence for what it is worth. Nei-
ther law nor custom sets up any required standard of educa-
tion for juries, and even to a jury of exceptional intelligence
such aid might be very helpful.
At the same time the facility by which diametrically
opposed expert testimony is obtainable in important trials has
brought this kind of evidence into disrepute in the popular
mind, and leaves its impress on the average jury. It is natural
that the judiciary which often is close to the public pulse
should anticipate legislative action, and endeavor to limit and
restrict the scope of such testimony.
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